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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JEANNETTE

u.

SWAN

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and
DR. DENNIS DR. THOEN,
Defendants and
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 14823

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETI'rION FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF THE PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondents have petitioned this Court for a rehearing
on the question of whether the appellate decision against them
should have been given retroactive application.
DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL
This Court ruled that an otherwise qualified
neurosurgeon from Los Angeles need not have had personal
medical contact or experience in Utah in order to testify as an
expert on the standard of care applicable to respondent
physicians in performing a myelogram and a spinal decompression
laminectomy.

-1-
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RESULT SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Appellant asks the Court to deny respondents' petition,
or, if the petition is granted, to rule that the Court's
previous decision to grant retroactive effect to its holding
was correct.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the only issue to be decided, in the event
respondents' petition is granted, is whether the prior holding
of this Court giving retroactive application to its decision
was correct, the relevant facts are limited.

Basically they

are that respondents were, at the time of the surgery which was
performed upon Mrs. Swan, board certified specialists in their
respective fields who considered themselves bound to follow
national rather than local standards of skill and care in
treating their patients.

(Tr. day 2 at 2; day 3 at 5 and 657;

see also Original Brief for Appellant at 44-45.)

The record

contains no evidence that respondents relied upon any prior
decisions of this Court in treating or agreeing to treat Mrs.
Swan.

Furthermore, it contains no evidence that retroactive

application of the Court's decision will place a burden upon
the administration of justice.
Finally, an additional fact having a bearing on whether
respondents' petition should be granted at all is that at no
time prior to their filing of this petition for rehearing did
either of them raise to this Court the issue of whether a
decision,

if adverse to them, should be applied prospectively

only.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
ON A PETITION FOR REHEARING, RESPONDENTS CANNOT
RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME, AND ALLEGE AS ERROR,
POINTS WHICH THEY FAILED TO ADDRESS AT ANY
PREVIOUS TIME IN THE APPELLATE PROCESS,
Drs. Lamb and Thoen, the respondents and petitioners in
this matter, requested a rehearing "solely as to the issue of
whether this Court's decision should be applied retroactively
or prospectvely."

Petition

&

Brief for Respondents at 2.

At

no time prior to the submission of their joint brief did either
of the respondents suggest that the decision of this Court, if
adverse to them, should be given only prospective application.
Upon submission of their petition and brief, respondents, for
the first time, claimed that the Court erred in applying its
decision retroactively.
In the recently published Appellate Advocacy Handbook
for the Utah Supreme Court, which was distributed by the Utah
State Bar, it is stated that "The points relied on [in a
petition for rehearing] must have been raised previously."
at 25.

Id.

Several Utah cases are cited in support of said

statement.

See Id. at 25, n. 2.

Any other policy would tend

to encourage parties to take a piecemeal approach to their
appeals and would defeat the efforts of the judiciary to
deliver opinions with finality.

Cf. Rolley v. Merle Norman

Cosmetics, Inc., 129 C.A.2d 844, 282 P.2d 991 (1955.).
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Since respondents' petition for rehearing is based
solely on assertions of error involving an issue which neither
of them saw fit to raise heretofore, they are precluded from
raising the issue now.

Their petition should be denied.

POINT II
RESPONDENTS NO NOT QUALIFY ~OR AN EXCEPTION TO THE
GENERAL RULE THAT AN OVERRULING DECISION WILL BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.
The general rule in Utah, as well as in other
jurisdictions, is that overruling decisions will be
retroactive as well as prospective application.

gi~en

State Farm

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah 2d
166, 493 P;2d 1002, 1003 (1972); Annot. 10 A.L.R.3d 1271
(1966); 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts §233 (1965).
In certain instances, exceptions to the general rule of
retroactivity have been granted where necessary (1) to prevent
an unfair cancellation of vested rights or invalidation of
justified reliance interests, especially in contract or
property matters; or (2) to avoid the imposition of
onerous and substantial burdens on the administation of
justice, especially in criminal matters.
at 1378.

See 10 A.L.R., supra

Utah uses similar guidelines in determining

whether an overruling decision should have retroactive effect.

-4-
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In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, supra, this Court declared that the rules governing
whether an overruling decision would be given only

prospecti~

application were
based upon the proposition that where persons had
entered into contracts and other business relationships
based upon justifiable reliance on the prior decisions
of courts, those. persons would be substantially harmed
if retroactive effect were given to overruling
decisions.
An additional factor was that retroactive
operation might greatly burden the administratrion of
justice. (Emphasis added.)
Id., 493 P.2d at 1003.
In order for the decision in the present case to be
declared prospective only, the record must show the

existen~

of contracts or business relationships between Mrs. Swan and
her doctors which were based upon the doctors'

justifiable

reliance interests in prior medical malpractice decisions of
this Court, or must show that retroactive application will
impose some great burden on the administration of justice.

A.

Existence of Justifiable Contractual Reliance Interests
An example of the type of justifiable contractual

reliance interests that are contemplated by the exception W
the general rule of retroactivity,

is found Cascade Security_

Bank v. Butler, 88 wash.2d 77, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
from the

(Dictum

·
· brief
Cascade case was cited by respondents in
t h e1r

at page 8.)
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The defendant in Cascade bought a parcel of real estate
on a contract. Several years later, while defendant

still

owned the property, plaintiff obtained judgment against him on
an unrelated matter.

At the time of the entry of judgment, the

law of the State of Washington provided that judgment liens did
not attach to real estate contracts.

Several days after entry

of the judgment against him, defendant assigned his interests
in the real estate contract to a third party who, in reliance
on the judgment lien law, apparently took no special
precautions to search out judgments against his assignor.

Some

months later, the third party in turn assigned his interests in
the contract to a fourth party who also apparently relied on
existing law concerning the inapplicability of judgment liens
to real estate contracts.

One year after the assignments,

plaintiff attempted to execute its judgment on the real estate
contract which was now in the possession of the fourth party.
The Washington Supreme Court overruled its prior
decisions, on which the third and fourth party relied, and held
that judgment liens did attach to real estate contracts.
However, because of the obvious reliance interests of both
third and fourth parties and because of the fact that a
retroactive application of its overruling decision would
unjustly work a forfeiture of the fourth party's property
rights which he in good faith believed were inviolate, the
court made its decision prospective only.

P.2a at 635.

Cascade, supra, 567

(For a similar discussion of reliance interests
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involving statutory construction and the advisability of
invalidating business arrangements which were made in good
faith, see Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 28 (Alaska 1976).)
The present case clearly does not involve a contract

~

business relationship such as was involved in Cascade SecuritL
Sta~

Bank v. Butler, supra or such as was contemplated by
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,

~~

There is no showing that either !lrs. Swan or her doctors ever
understood or agreed that the level of medical care which she
was to receive would be inferior to that available in other
cities, due to the prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.
Furthermore, there is no showing that respondent doctors were
even aware of the prior rulings of this Court.
Even if Drs. Lamb and Thoen had been aware of this
Court's medical malpractice decisions, there is no showing that
they relied upon them in determining what methods and
procedures they would employ to treat Mrs. Swan.

On the

contrary, the evidence showed that respondents were specialists
in their fields who considered themselves to be governed by
standards of medical care that they admitted were uniform
throughout the country and not unique to Utah or to Salt Lake
City.

(Tr. day 2 at 2; day 3 at 5, 67; see also Original Brief

for Appellant at 44-45.)

In no sense can respondents now claim

properly to have relied on the "strict locality rule" in their
practices.
Furthermore, if respondents had relied on the "strict
locality rule" to shield them from liability for employing

-7-
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inferior treatment methods and procedures, such reliance would
not have been justified.

Drs. Lamb and Thoen were both board

certified specialists in their respective fields, practicing
medicine in an area noted for its fine hospitals, outstanding
libraries, fully equipped laboratory facilities and readily
available advanced medical equipment.

Under such circumstances

they had an obligation to do more than just get by. It would be
unjustifiable for respondents to assume, on the basis of what
they claim is a 100 year-old legal doctrine, that they did not
have to employ the same level of skill and care as that
practiced by their similarly situated professional colleagues
in other cities.
Respondents ask this Court to believe that a
retroactive application of its decision will cause them and all
Utah physicians "great hardship and injustice," and will
further subject them and others to "much greater liability."
Such an argument is deceptive and untrue.

It erroneously

presupposes that all or nearly all Utah physicians have been
and are practicing medicine in accordance with lower standards
of skill and care than their counterparts in Los Angeles and
elsewhere.

The fact is, as noted by Justice Ellett in his

majority opinion, that "Our quality of care in Utah rates with
the best in the nation."
Aug. 16, 1978) at 113.

Swan v. Lamb, No. 14823 (Utah, filed
The decision of this Court does not

raise the level of existing standards of practice. Rather, it
legally recognizes and adopts the standards that have existed
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in the medical profession since long before Mrs. Swan underwent
surgery in 1973.
Utah doctors are not threatened by the prospect of being
measured by standards which they have not only met but exceeded
for decades.

The contention that the retroactive application

of the Court's decision in the present case would cause
widespread hardship and injustice is untenable.
B.

Existence of Substantial Burden on the Administration of

Justice.
There is no record of any facts which would tend to

sh~

that the retroactive application of the Court's decision in the
present case would generate any kind of burden, let alone a
substantial or great one, upon the administration of justice.
Such burdensome situations usually are found only where the
retroactive application of a decision would result in needless
reopening of cases which have long since been finalized and
laid to rest.

Several examples appear in the cases cited but

not elaborated upon in respondents' brief.

Most of these

involve matters of criminal procedure.
Characteristic of such cases is Russell v. Blackwell, 53
Haw. 274, 492 P.2d 953 (1953), cited in Petition & Brief for
Respondents at 4. There, the defendant was convicted of murder
and robbery on the basis of guilty pleas which he entered
through his attorney in 1965.
prison.

He was sentenced to life in

In 1969 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in an

unrelated case, that a guilty plea in a criminal case was
invalid unless the record of its entry affirmatively disclosed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that it had been entered voluntarily and intelligently.
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

Boykin

After Boykin, the defendant

in Russell commenced a habeas corpus proceeding seeking to
withdraw his earlier guilty plea on the basis of the Boykin
decision.

The Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that if it granted

retroactive application to Boykin, it would impose an
intolerable burden on the

ad~inistration

of justice by

subjecting to challenge the conviction of every person whose
guilty plea was ever accepted by a court.

It therefore adopted

the position of the California Supreme Court as stated in In re
Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449- (1969).
"To invalidate all such prior guilty pleas years
and decades after their acceptance would have a dolorous
effect upon the administraiton of justice.
In light of
these combined legal and pragmatic factors, we believe
Boykin v. Alabama and the procedures adopted therein
must be given prospective application only • • • • "
Russell, 492 P.2d at 956.
Concerns similar to those expressed in Russell, supra,
over the viability of the criminal justice system in the event
of retroactive application of overruling decisions, also
influenced the outcomes in several of the other cases cited but
not elaborated upon by respondents.

State v. Stenrud, 113

Ariz. 327, 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), cited in Petition & Brief for
Respondents at 4, involved a habeas corpus challenge to the
propriety of the meth6d by which a guilty plea was entered in a
narcotics case.

The basis of the writ was

-10-

Boykin-like
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overruling decision.

See also Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash .2d 501,

554 P.2d 1032 (1976),

(a manslaughter case), and In re Bye, 12

Cal.3d 96, 115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854 (1974),
addiction case), both cited in Petition

&

(a narcotics

Brief for Respondents

at 4.
The decision in the present case has none of the
characteristics that would cause its retroactivE application to
create a burden upon the administration of justice.
no criminal issues involved.
flood the courts.

There are

No writs of habeas corpus will

Medical malpractice cases which have

final conclusions will not be reopened.

gone~

It is doubtful whether

any of them could be reopened on the basis of the single issue
decided by this Court anyway.

As was stated in State Farm

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah 2d
166, 493 P.2d 1002 (1972):
The record in this case would not support a
decision limiting the effect of the prior decision to
future application. There is no showing that any
considerable number of persons or corporations would be
affected by letting the decisions apply
retrospectively. There is no showing that injustice
would result or that administration of justice would in
any way be affected.
Id. at 1003.
There is, therefore, no reason to alter the retroactive
application of the Court's decision.
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--POINT III
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S
DECISION IN THE PRESENT CASE ACCORDS \-HTH, RATHER
THAN CONTRADICTS, THE DECISIONAL LAW OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
Respondents argue in Point II of their brief that a
retroactive application of the decision rendered in the present
case would be contrary to the principles announced in previous
cases.

A close examination of the "previous cases" to which

respondents refer shows their facts to be so different from
those of the present case as to make them inapposite.
The inference that the holding in Brunyer v. Salt Lake
County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976), evidences this Court's
refusal to apply its decisions retroactively, is incorrect.
Brunyer was not an overruling decision.
construction decision.

It was a statutory

It involved the dismissal of a

third-party complaint which sought contribution from a joint
tortfeasor.

The dismissal was granted.

This Court affirmed

the dismissal and held that the third party plaintiff could not
sue for contribution since the statute which created the right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors was "by its terms" not
retroactive to the time the tort was committed.

This

explanation appears in the omitted portion of the quote which
respondents cited in their brief:

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The contribution statute established a primary right
and duty which was not in existence at the time the
injuries in this case arose, and the statute not beinq
retroactive by it terms did not create a right on~
behalf of third-party plaintiffs.
(Bmphasis added.)~
at 522; cf. Petition & Brief for Respondents at 10.
Rubalcava v. Gissman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389
(1963), like Brunyer, supra, also involved questions of
statutory construction.

In Rubalcava, a wife who was riding in

a car driven by her intoxicated husband when it collided with a
train, sued her husband's estate for her injuries.

The issue

arose as to whether the statute which permitted intramarital
contract and property actions also permitted intramarital tort
actions.

The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the statute and, in

an opinion authored by Justice Crockett, concluded that it did
not.

The Court declined to revise and change the unambiguous

work of the legislature.

Obviously no questions concerninry the

retroactive or prospective application of the holding were
raised or decided since no new rights were created and no old
rights were extinguished.
State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977), involved
issues of statutory construction which had a direct bearing on
whether two convicted criminals would live or die.

The state

in Kelbach sought to appeal what it claimed were errors in ~e
trial court's imposition of sentences of life imprisonment
instead of death.

The issue on appeal was whether the

statute which authorized state appeals of criminal
decisions was broad enough to permit the state to appeal a

-13-
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criminal sentence.

Upon analysis of the statutes and the cases

which had construed them, the Court held against the State.
Once again no issues of retroactive or prospective application
of the ruling were raised or decided due to the fact that
nothing had been overruled.
The three foregoing cases dealt with vastly different
issues from those presented in the present case.

Each of them

involved rulings on statutes which had been authored by the
legislature.

Each also involved interpretations of

legislative intents and purposes.

Because the cases also each

involved issues on which the legislature had made findings and
conclusions, the Court was obliged to give a certain deference
to such findings and conclusions irrespective of its
disagreement or agreement with them.

None of the cases

contained holdings which overruled existing law, therefore,
none of them involved more than peripheral considerations of
such things as the reliance interests of the litigants, or the
burdens on the administration of justice, which are pivotal
in deciding issues of retroactive
application.

versus prospective

For these and other reasons, the dicta of the

foregoing cases do not govern the outcome of the present case.
Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303 (1977), reh. 567 P.2d
625 (1977), was an action by a divorced wife to compel her
ex-husband to continue to make child support payments for a
daughter who, according to statute, had attained her majority,
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(then age 18).

The wife argued that since males did not,

under the statute, attain their majority until age 21, the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States required that females be
treated the same.

After a series of appeals and remands

involving both the State and Federal Supreme Courts as well as
the trial court, it was ultimately held that for purposes of
the Stanton case, both males and females attained their
majority at age 18.

The Stanton decision was, by its terms,

made prospective only.
The reasons for the Stanton opinion are similar to those
involved in the habeas corpus cases cited infra at 8-10.

In

child support matters, as in criminal imprisonment matters, the
Court retains a type of continuing jurisdiction.
Stanton decision had been made retroactive,

If the

it is conceivable

that a flood of petitions would have been filed requesting
alteration or amendment of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
divorce decrees involving child support payments to males
between the ages of 18 and 21.

A substantial burden on the

administration of justice would thereby have been created.
Furthermore, the terms of child support agreements which
were incorporated into divorce decrees were often reached by
parties in reliance on the statute of majority which treated
males and females differently.

To nullify the justifiable

contractual expectations and plans of such parties by a
retroactive .change of the law would have been unfair.
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See

concurring opinion of Justice Crockett, Stanton, 564 P.2d at
305.
As was pointed out infra at 4-10, the present case
involves no justifiable contractual reliance interests and no
potential great burdens on the administration of justice.
Courts maintain no continuing jursidiction over concluded
medical malprcatice cases.

There is no reason to limit the

application of the decision in Swan v. Lamb.
The last of the Utah Supreme Court decisions cited by
respondents in their second argument actually supports the
position of Mrs. Swan.

See State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002
(1972).

In the State Farm case, plaintiff insurer paid the

medical bills of its insured who had been involved in an auto
accident with defendant's insured in 1966.

Despite receiving a

notice of subrogation from plaintiff, defendant proceeded to
reimburse the injured party for his medical expenses. Plaintiff
sued, claiming that a 1969 overruling decision of this Court
required defendant to pay such sums to it because of the
subrogation notice.

Defendant argued that the 1969 overruling

decision, was not retroactive and that the law prior to the
overruling

decisio~

been applied.
retroactive.

which permitted its actions, should have

The trial court ruled that the holding was
This Court affirmed.

It recognized the general

rule that overruling decisions were ordinarily retroactive
unless they would improperly frustrate justifiable contractual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reliance interests or would greatly burden the administration
of justice.

Id. at 1003.

The Court held that since the record

in the case showed that no considerable number of persons or
corporations would be affected and that no injustice or great
burden on the administration of justice would occur,
decision was to be applied retroactively.

Id.

its 1969

See infra at 5

and 10.
CONCLUSION
Respondents should not be granted a "rehearing" on an
issue which they never raised in briefs or arguments and which
was never "heard" by this Court.

Such a practice constitutes a

piecemeal approach to the appellate process which is not
permitted.
The general rule that overruling decisions are to be
given retroactive effect was correctly applied in this case.
The conditions under which exceptions to such a rule are
occasionally granted were not met by respondents.

Ors. Lamb

and Thoen showed neither the existence of justifiable
contractual reliance interests in the prior decisions of this
Court, nor the imposition of great burdens on the
administration of justice that were requisites to the granting
of a prospective-only decision.
There is no inconsistency between the Court's decision
in this case and the decisions which it has rendered in other
cases.

The retroactive application which it has granted its

decision cauees no severe hardship or injustice

~nd
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imposes no intolerable burdens. Its prior ruling should stand,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of October, 1978.

wWoaff!N~-

RALPH L. EWSNUP
HANSEN & ORTON
Attorneys for Appellant
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
Telephone: 533-0400
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Geniel Johnson, being first duly sworn, says: That she
is employed by the law firm of Hansen & Orton, Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant, that she served the attached Appellant's
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing upon Defendants
and Respondents by placing a true and correct copy thereof in
an envelope addressed to the following:
Rex J. Hanson, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent Dr. Thoen
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Ut~h 84101
Ray R. Christensen, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent Dr. Lamb
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
the 20th day of October, 1978.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of October, 1978.

mard}p_~·C ~/)~01
:uo'.::J

NOTARY PUB

RESIDING AT:
Salt Lake County, Utah
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